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Bigpond vs. Nevada,128 Nev. Advanced Opinion No. 10 (Mar. 01, 2012)1
EVIDENCE – CHARACTER OR PROPENSITY
Summary
The Court considered an appeal from a district court regarding admission of evidence of
“other crimes, wrongs or acts” for non-propensity purposes not listed in NRS 48.045(2).
Disposition/Outcome
The Court concluded that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admitted for
non-propensity purposes other than those listed in NRS 48.045(2) because the purposes listed
represent an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of permitted purposes.
The Court recognized previous inconsistent applications of NRS 48.045(2) and overruled
previous opinions that applied a broad rule of exclusion. Other bad act evidence still has the
presumption of inadmissibility, and the Court modified the first of the three Tinch factors so that
prosecutors must request a hearing to (1) prove that the prior bad act is not only relevant but
offered to prove purposes other than propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing
evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The Court concluded that the district court satisfied the three factors,
thus did not abuse it discretion in allowing in the other bad act evidence.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence for
striking his wife, knocking her unconscious. This was Appellant’s third offense within seven
years. Prior to trial, the State motioned to admit the victim’s prior allegations of domestic
violence against the Appellant, suspecting that, upon taking the stand, the victim would recant
her pretrial statements. The State claimed that it offered the evidence of prior domestic violence
for non-propensity purposes, namely as a possible explanation for the victim’s anticipated
recantation and to put the couple’s relationship in context. Appellant filed a motion in limine,
arguing the evidence did not fall under one of the non-propensity purposes listed under NRS
48.045(2). The First Judicial District Court reserved judgment until the trial to see if the victim
would recant. After the victim recanted, the district court allowed admission of the prior
allegations as its relevancy was relevant to explain the recantation and the couple’s relationship.
Appellant was convicted and appealed.
Discussion
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, sitting as a three justice panel. The Court began its
analysis with Appellant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by allowing
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence. Appellant cited to Rowbottom v. State to support his
argument.2 Rowbottom precluded admission of prior bad acts when offered to show the
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105 Nev. 472, 485, 779 P.2d 934, 942 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. 129, 139 n.
34, 110 P.3d 1058, 1065 n.34 (2005).
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relationship between the defendant and his family because NRS 48.045 did not explicitly allow
for such a non-propensity purpose. In the current case, the Court overruled this portion of
Rowbottom, finding that the reasoning reflects Nevada’s prior bad act jurisprudence and not the
approach codified in NRS 48.045.
Under common law, courts either narrowly excluded evidence of uncharged misconduct
or favored broad exclusion, unless a narrow list of exceptions applied.3 Under this original rule,
such evidence was excluded only if its relevance relied solely on proving the defendant’s
criminal disposition. It was admissible if the evidence had any other relevant purpose.4 The
second, broader view, excluded evidence of uncharged misconduct unless “it tend[ed] to
establish either (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme
or plan, so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others or (5) the identity
of the person charged.”5 The broader rule became the norm in People v. Molineux,6 and Nevada
followed that trend in State v. McFarlin.7
The original “narrow rule” resurged with the codification of the Model Code or Evidence,
Uniform Rules of Evidence, and finally the Federal Rules of Evidence. FRE 404 (b) “plac[ed]
greater emphasis on (the) admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.”8 The Nevada State
Legislature adopted NRS 48.045(2), which closely mirrors the language of the FRE 404 (b),
diverging only where the federal provisions sharply differed from Nevada law.9
In interpreting the plain meaning of NRS 48.045(2), the Court found that the language
narrowly excludes evidence of previous crimes and wrongdoings, as the “other purposes” listed
in the statute illustrate rather than limit when such evidence may be admitted. NRS 48.045(2)
prohibits the admission of other bad acts to prove propensity, but such evidence may be admitted
“for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake of accident.”10 The statute also states that “evidence of other
crimes may be admissible when offered for purposes that fall outside the narrow limits of the
general rule.”11 The Court found that the statute permits other bad act evidence, so long as it is
not admitted to prove propensity. The inclusion of a list of “other purposes” provides an
illustrative rather than exhaustive list of other non-propensity purposes.
The Court recognized its previous inconsistent applications of NRS 48.045(2).12 However,
it emphasized that the narrow exclusion does not remove the “presumption [that] inadmissibility
3

Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1005 (1938).
Id.
5
State v. McFarlin, 41 Nev. 486, 494, 172 P.371 373 (1918).
6
61 N.E. 285, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901).
7
41 Nev. 486, 494, 172 P.371 373 (1918).
8
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:31 (2009) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-650
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7081.
9
See A Proposed Evidence Code for the State of Nevada: Hearing on S.B. 12 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
56th Leg. (Nev., February, 10 1971) (statement of Assemb. Melvin D. Close, .Jr, Chairman, Subcomm. For Study of
an Evidence Code); LEGIS. COMM’N OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, A PROPOSED EVIDENCE CODE, Bulletin No.
90 (Nev. 1970).
10
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.045(2) (2009).
11
Id.
12
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Theriault v. State, 92 Nev. 185, 189, 547 P 2.d 668, 671 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State, 111
Nev. 1409, 1415 n.4, 906 P.2d 714, 717 n.4 (1995); see also Rowbottom at 485, 779 P.2d 934, 942; Willet v. State,
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attaches to all prior bad act evidence”13 and that uncharged bad act evidence is often irrelevant
and has a prejudicial effect.14
In Tinch v. State,15 the court outlined three factors other bad act evidence must meet
prior to admission: (1) the evidence must be relevant to the crime charged, (2) the act is proven
by clean and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court modified the test to accommodate for
the narrow limits of exclusion. Under the current modifications, prosecutors must request a
hearing, establish the elements of the test, and prove that the prior bad act is not only relevant but
offered to prove purposes other than propensity.
In this case, the Court found that the district court did not abuse discretion in allowing the
evidence of previous domestic violence, as the court satisfied the three factor Tinch test outside
the presence of the jury.16 First, the evidence of previous domestic violence is relevant to the
case as it provides a possible reason as to why the victim may recant her prior accusations and
puts the victim’s relationship with the appellant in context.17 Second, the previous bad acts can
be proven with clear and convincing evidence, as the appellant previously pleaded guilty to the
two previous domestic violence charges involving the victim. Third, the court weighed the
probative value of the evidence and found that it was not outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. The district court took steps to limit the danger of unfair prejudice, as it admitted only
the victim’s prior accusations and not the previous convictions. Further, it issued a limiting
instruction18 to the jury clarifying that the prosecution offered the testimony only to provide a
possible explanation for the victim recanting and for the purpose of putting the couple’s
relationship in context. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction, but
further cautioned that use of prior bad act evidence relies heavily of the facts of the case.19
Conclusion
Evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be admitted for non-propensity purposes
other than those listed in NRS 48.045(2).
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